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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to World Bank estimates, more than one trillion 
dollars in bribes are paid each year.1  In response to the growing 
threat of corruption in international business, the administration of 
George W. Bush inaugurated an era of stringent anti-bribery 
enforcement.2  The Obama Administration continued this legacy, 
making it a priority to crack down on incidences of global bribery.3  
In a surging wave of prosecutions against multinational 
corporations, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) invoked the broad 
jurisdictional scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA” or 
“the Act”).  The government’s enforcement tactics have relied 
heavily on the 1998 amendments to the FCPA—Sections 78 dd-1–
3 specifically—which broadened the power of the DOJ to prosecute 
companies and individuals, both in the United States and abroad.  
From its very inception, however, the FCPA relied on vague 
language to define the recipients of bribes and the nature of bribery.  
The problem was compounded by the 1998 amendments, which 
greatly expanded jurisdiction of the FCPA.  The law’s lack of clarity 
gave considerable power to prosecutors to interpret its reach. 
Although FCPA enforcement increased in the past decade, an 
overwhelming number of prosecutions did not result in trials; 
instead, it produced a proliferation of pleas and pre-trial diversion 
agreements, such as Non Prosecution Agreements (“NPAs”) and 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”).4  In the overwhelming 
 
 1  Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global Governance 
Director Daniel Kaufmann, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457~pagePK:3437
0~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).  
 2  Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www. fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-
101#q19 (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (arguing that the main reasons for the growth in 
FCPA enforcement include “companies (large and small and across a variety of industry 
sectors). . . mov[ing] into international markets”; the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
in 2002 which “has caused issuers to more actively investigate questionable 
transactions particularly in foreign subsidiaries”; increased resources for enforcement 
agencies; stronger focus on international business by foreign law enforcement; and 
increased monitoring of enforcement activity by NGOs and civil society). 
 3  According to Attorney General Eric Holder, FCPA prosecutions are necessary 
because “paying large monetary penalties cannot be viewed by the business 
community as merely ‘the cost of doing business.’”  Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., 
Remarks at the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (May 31, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100531.html.  
 4  The FCPA has more settlement based on NPAs and DPAs than any other area of 
corporate criminality.  Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 907, 933–34 (2010) (“While NPAs and DPAs are utilized in non-FCPA enforcement 
actions, the ‘lion’s share’ of these agreements are used to resolve FCPA enforcement 
actions”).  For a discussion on Non Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution 
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number of FCPA prosecutions, corporations negotiate a deal before 
the case ever reaches the courtroom.  Corporations prefer to settle, 
pay the fines levied, and continue to pursue business, rather than 
risk the high penalties and publicity that can result from a trial.5  
Individuals, many of whom are not U.S. citizens, are also likely to 
plead guilty and receive a reduced penalty, rather than risk a trial.6  
More importantly, unlike many areas of the law in which most cases 
are resolved through trial and settlement, there is almost a complete 
absence of judicial review of the FCPA.7  The strong incentive to 
accept liability—what I call the “culture of settlement” in this 
Article—gives the DOJ enormous discretion in its interpretation of 
the FCPA.8  Due to the scarcity of trials, the most frequent 
interpretation of the FCPA has come from the DOJ and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), not federal judges.  
This lack of precedent allows FCPA investigations to be conducted 
largely on the DOJ’s terms.  The jurisdictional language of the FCPA 
 
Agreements in the context of corporate criminality, see generally Brandon Garrett, 
Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (considering the issues and 
strategy associated with prosecutors who seek structural reform remedies for accused 
corporations); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The 
Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006) 
(suggesting that corporations try to negotiate more lenient terms with prosecutors 
when given the opportunity).  
 5  See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate 
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434 (2007); Finder & McConnell, supra note 
4, at 1.  
 6  It is worth noting from the outset that the issue of whether to go to trial in an 
individual prosecution depends on different factors than a corporate prosecution.  The 
strength of the evidence, the prosecutor’s offer of settlement, the threat of a harsher 
penalty at trial, and the accused’s beliefs about their own culpability all inform the 
decision of whether to go to trial.  
 7  Koehler, supra note 4, at 932 (“The fact remains that every corporate FCPA 
enforcement action over the last two decades has been resolved through a DOJ NPA, 
DPA, plea (or combination thereof) or SEC settlement, and nearly every individual 
FCPA enforcement action has been resolved through a plea or SEC settlement.”). 
 8  Although the FCPA is unique in its lack of judicial review, the FCPA “culture of 
settlement” does reflect a larger habit of settlement in other areas of corporate 
criminality.  When compared with individual criminal defendants, corporations must 
protect the value of their company, have more financial resources at their disposal, and 
do not face the same possibilities of jail time.  For a general discussion of larger trends 
of settlement in corporate criminality, see Samuel Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity 
Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 507 (2006) (arguing that in choosing to settle, a 
corporation can “dampen[] reputational damage by portraying itself as accepting 
responsibility”); Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 415 (2007) (arguing that it is difficult for corporations to 
avoid settlement and that “even institutions as powerful in the financial world as 
Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase can cave under pressure to settle to avoid an 
indictment, even an unjust one”). 
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is very broad, but critics have challenged whether many defendants 
in these cases even belong in American courts. 
This Article focuses on two weaknesses of the FCPA: the issue 
of jurisdiction, specifically its expansion in sections 78dd-1 through 
78dd-3 in the 1998 Amendments, and second, the lack of judicial 
review, a result of the preference shown by both prosecution and 
defense to settle outside of court.  These two issues are closely 
linked.  The initially vague language of the 1977 FCPA, coupled with 
the later expansion of jurisdiction, gave the DOJ a wide mandate to 
prosecute almost anyone anywhere.  The corporate “culture of 
settlement” led to an abundance of pleas, pretrial agreements, and 
a paucity of precedent. 
In 2011, the DOJ launched the largest ever prosecution of 
individuals under the FCPA in what became known as “The Africa 
Sting Trials.”  The prosecution had a strong expectation of 
settlement.  But after most of the defendants collectively refused to 
plead, a jury trial commenced, and the FCPA was exposed to rare 
judicial scrutiny.  The case resulted in several ‘not guilty’ verdicts, 
two mistrials, and the DOJ’s eventual dismissal of all charges.  The 
trial exposed weaknesses in the government’s use of evidence, in the 
sting operation, and most importantly, in the vague language and 
the expanded jurisdiction of the Act.  In the first ever ruling on 
section 78dd-3 of the FCPA, Judge Leon restricted the jurisdiction of 
the FCPA over foreigners.9  Yet additional steps are still needed to 
clarify the language of the statute.  Clarification of the vague 
language in section 78dd-3, in particular, would serve to define 
jurisdiction more precisely and to counter uncertainty created by the 
“culture of settlement” and lack of judicial review. 
As this Article will show, much of the confusion results from a 
key phrase relating to acts “in furtherance of an offer” of bribery.  In 
order to prosecute either a U.S. citizen or a foreigner either abroad 
or on U.S. territory for violation of the FCPA, the statutory language 
is not clear as to whether the act itself must be illegal or whether it 
can be a legal act committed in furtherance of an illegal bribery 
scheme.  At present, there is no agreement about the meaning of the 
language and interpretations vary widely.  This Article suggests one 
important change in that language that will make the law clearer. 
This Article surveys the FCPA, its history, weaknesses, and 
prospects for successful enforcement.  Part I reviews the history of 
the FCPA and its amendments, followed by a recommendation for 
 
 9  See Sections III.A–III.D.  
REDIKER FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  8:40 PM 
2015] THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 57 
reforming the language of section 78dd-3 of the Act.  Part II 
examines the “culture of settlement” that has resulted from 
corporate prosecutions and the effect on the prosecution of foreign 
nationals.  Part III analyzes the outcome of the Africa Sting Trials—
including the role of judicial review in narrowing jurisdiction—
illustrating the need for further clarification of the text of the FCPA. 
II. HISTORY OF THE FCPA AND ITS 1988 AND 1998 AMENDMENTS 
This Part examines the origins of, as well as the 1988 and 1998 
amendments to, the FCPA.  It surveys significant arguments that 
have been made about the jurisdictional reach of the Act.  Section 
I.A looks at the inception of the FCPA as a response to corruption in 
the Nixon era.  Section I.B examines the 1988 and 1998 
amendments, noting significant ambiguities in the language of the 
law.  Section I.C surveys the debate about whether the FCPA is 
overly broad in its extraterritorial enforcement. 
A. Origins of the FCPA 
The FCPA has its origins in the Watergate Scandal of 1975.10  
During an investigation of Nixon and his close advisors, federal 
agents discovered undisclosed “slush funds” established by U.S.-
based multinational corporations to influence elections.11  Nixon’s 
campaign had received money from these funds, which it used to 
bribe foreign officials and law enforcement agents.12  After Vietnam, 
the Carter Administration sought to rehabilitate the global image of 
the United States,13 and in 1977, Congress unanimously passed the 
FCPA.  President Carter hailed the bill as historic, noting that 
“[c]orrupt practices between corporations and public officials 
overseas undermine the integrity and stability of governments and 
harm our relations with other countries. . . .  This law makes corrupt 
payments to foreign officials illegal under United States law.”14  
When the legislation was passed, the United States became the first 
 
 10  S. Rep. No. 93-981, at 445–92 (1974). 
 11  Id.  
 12  Id.  
 13  Kevin Davis, Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, Self-
Interest, or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 499–500 (2012); see also George 
Esper, Communists Take Over Saigon; U.S. Rescue Fleet is Picking Up Vietnamese Who Fled 
in Boats, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1975, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/learning/ 
general/onthisday /big/0430.htmlarticle.  
 14  President James E. Carter, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure 
Bill Statement on Signing S. 305 into Law, 2 Pub. Papers 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977), available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7036.  
REDIKER FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  8:40 PM 
58 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
and only country in the world with strict penalties for companies 
engaged in business practices that involved bribery.15 
The FCPA criminalized any use of U.S. funds to bribe foreign 
officials.16  Its substantive sections were comprised of accounting 
and anti-bribery provisions.17  Its accounting provisions required 
public companies to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, 
which in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”18  Its anti-
bribery provisions covered two groups: issuers of certain securities 
regulated by the SEC, including American Depository Receipts,19 
and “domestic concerns,” which included “any individual who is a 
citizen, national or resident of the United States or any corporation, 
partnership, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organization, or sole proprietorship” which has its principal place 
of business in the United States, or is organized under the laws of 
the United States.20  To be liable for prosecution, issuers or domestic 
concerns had to make use of the U.S. mails or “any instrumentality 
of interstate commerce” to make an offer, payment, promise to pay, 
or gift for the purpose “of obtaining or retaining business” to one of 
three recipients.21  These recipient groups included “foreign 
officials”; foreign political parties, officials of such parties, or their 
candidates; or a person accepting the role of intermediary “while 
knowing or having reason to know“ about the bribery between the 
issuer or domestic concern and the foreign official or political 
party.22  Congress specifically refrained from asserting jurisdiction 
 
 15  Robert Blume & Taylor McConkie, Navigating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
The Increasing Cost of Overseas Bribery, 36 COLO. LAW. 91, 91 (2007).  
 16  Melissa Kelly Hurst, Eliminating Bribery in International Business Transactions, 6 J. 
INT’L L. & PRAC. 111, 120 (1997). 
 17  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd (1)–(3), 78ff (2006)) [hereinafter FCPA of 
1977].  
 18  Id.  
 19  Id.  
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  In the original version passed in 1977, the FCPA prohibited payments to third 
parties if an issuer “knew” or there was “reason to know” that all or a portion of the 
payment would be given, offered, or promised to a foreign official.  This inspired 
serious debate, with critics stating that the term “reason to know” was ambiguous 
enough that negligent payments could fall within its scope.  See H. Lowell Brown, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under The 1998 Amendments To The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Does The Government’s Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
239 (2001); Lisa Harriman Randall, Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657 (1997); Robert S. Levy, The Antibribery Provisions of the 
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over non-U.S. individuals and companies.23 
The language of the Act was vague from its inception.  Two of 
the Act’s greatest weaknesses were that it failed to lucidly define 
“foreign official” and the phrase “obtaining and retaining business” 
or “directing business to any person.”  Both of the terms from the 
original FCPA were unchanged by later amendments.  “Foreign 
official” was defined as “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, 
or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such 
government or department, agency, or instrumentality.”24  The 
definition left open the possibility that any employee or official of 
a state-owned enterprise might be considered a “foreign official,” 
thus encompassing much of the population in countries with 
socialist governments or a preponderance of state-owned 
enterprises.25  In United States v. Esquenazi (a case which will be 
considered below), an appellate court is expected to rule for the first 
time as to who can be classified a “foreign official” under the 
FCPA.26 
The phrase “obtaining and retaining business” was also quite 
vague in scope.  The defendant in United States v. Kozeny was charged 
with conspiring to violate the FCPA because he funneled payments 
to Azeri officials to encourage the privatization of a state-owned oil 
company in Azerbaijan.27  The language left it unclear whether 
payments made in the direction of privatization, the first step to 
business, would be considered bribery.28  Similarly, in United States 
v. Kay, the court ruled that the phrase “to obtain or retain business” 
 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Are They Really As Valuable As We Think They Are?, 
10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 79–80 (1985). 
 23  Brown, supra note 22, at 292 (“Congress ultimately decided not to include 
foreign nationals within the definition of a domestic concern.  In effect, unless a foreign 
national was an ‘issuer’ or there was some other basis for the United States to assert 
jurisdiction, a foreign national was beyond the reach of the Act.”). 
 24  FCPA of 1977, supra note 17. 
 25  DOJ Files Response Brief in Historic 11th Circuit “Foreign Official” Appeal, FCPA 
PROFESSOR BLOG (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-files-response-
brief-in-historic-11th-circuit-foreign-official-appeal. 
 26  Id. (The 11th Circuit will determine a “host of issues, including whether the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in its jury instruction regarding what constitutes an 
‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government – and thus who are ‘foreign officials’ under 
the FCPA.”). 
 27  United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 541 F.3d 
166 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 28  In this way, it potentially included the many businesses and NGOs that entered 
the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Eastern Europe with the aim of encouraging and 
profiting from the break up of state-owned concerns.   
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was “genuinely debatable and thus ambiguous.”29  The court 
reasoned that the “most significant statutory construction problem 
results from the failure of the language of the FCPA to give a clear 
indication of the exact scope of the business nexus element.”30  The 
hazy language of 1977 was never clarified, either through judicial 
review or further emendation.  It has remained the core of the FCPA 
to the present, and its lack of clarity has been exacerbated by the 
expansion of jurisdiction in the amendments. 
B. The 1988 and 1998 Amendments 
The 1977 version of the FCPA was amended by the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act and the International and Anti-
Bribery Fair Competition Act, in 1988 and 1998, respectively.  The 
initial purpose of the FCPA was to police only the illicit conduct of 
American businesses.  There was nonetheless an expectation held by 
Congress and in policy circles that other nations would pass similar 
legislation in the wake of the FCPA.31  International support, 
however, did not follow, and though FCPA enforcement was rare, 
some critics blamed Congress for harming American businesses.32  
In the eleven years following the passage of the FCPA, there was a 
growing sentiment in Congress that efforts to combat corruption 
must occur on a global, rather than national, scale.33 
In 1988, Congress took concrete steps to encourage the 
international community to follow the lead of the United States by 
enacting anti-bribery legislation.  The Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act formally called upon President Reagan to 
 
 29  United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743–44 (5th Cir. 2004) (“In approaching 
this issue, the district court concluded that the FCPA’s language is ambiguous, and 
proceeded to review the statute’s legislative history.  We agree with the court’s finding 
of ambiguity. . . .”).  Some authors have argued that despite the court’s characterization 
of the FCPA as ambiguous, the case has led to a further increase in prosecutions.  See 
Evan P. Lestelle, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms of Foreign Public 
Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REV. 527, 535 (2008) (“In the nearly 
three years since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kay, the SEC brought more FCPA 
enforcement actions than in any 36-month period since the statute’s enactment.”). 
 30  Kay, 359 F.3d at 744.  
 31  Daniel Patrick Ashe, Note, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: 
The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2897, 2906 (2005). 
 32  PIERRE CHARPIE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY LAWS 45 (2003) (citing Business Accounting and Foreign 
Trade Simplification Act: Hearings on S. 430 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. And 
Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1986)). 
 33  Id.   
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pursue international agreements that supported enforcement of the 
FCPA.34  The language of the 1988 amendments sharpened the focus 
of the FCPA by modifying the Act’s state of mind requirement35 and 
adding two affirmative defenses.36  As to the state of mind 
requirement, legislators sought to move away from the 1977 
requirement that parties “know” or “have a reason to know“ about 
the bribery since they did not want to encourage willful blindness 
on behalf of corrupt third parties, but also did not want to 
criminalize simple negligence.37  Congress thus amended the Act to 
criminalize the payment of third-party bribes, but only if the payor 
had actual knowledge of the intended results or acted with a 
conscious disregard for the truth.38  The affirmative defenses further 
protected individuals from liability in cases where their payments 
were legal in the country in which they were made, or considered 
“reasonable and bona fide expenditures.”39  In addition to the 
affirmative defenses, the law was amended to allow for “grease 
payments,” that is, money paid to facilitate or hasten routine 
business transactions.40  The defenses and amendments thus 
encouraged a more flexible standard of adherence to the FCPA, 
 
 34  Ashe, supra note 31, at 2906 (“Moreover, the amendment allowed an affirmative 
defense if the payment to the foreign public official was lawful in the jurisdiction of 
the bribe recipient.  The 1988 amendments also created an affirmative defense for 
reasonable expenses directly related to legitimate promotional activities.”). 
 35  Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 
(2000)); Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-
3 (2000)); FCPA of 1977, supra note 17, at § 78dd (1)–(3).  
 36  Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 
(2000)); Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 
(2000)); FCPA of 1977, supra note 17, at §§ 78dd (1)–(3); Ashe supra note 31, at 2902. 
 37  FCPA of 1977, supra note 17, at §§ 78dd(1)–(3); Ashe, supra note 31, at 2902. 
 38  Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 
(2000)) [hereinafter “FCPA of 1988”]. 
 39  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (2006) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c) (2006) (for 
domestic concerns); 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-3(c) (2006) (for any person).  Little case law 
exists to interpret the scope of the first affirmative defense, although one court has 
interpreted it rather narrowly.  See U.S. v. Kozeny, supra note 27, at 697.  The defendant 
was charged under the FCPA with bribing a government official in Azerbaijan.  Id.  The 
defendant argued, however, that he was not guilty of bribery under Azeri law because 
the bribe was extorted from him and he then reported the bribe to the authorities.  U.S. 
v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  Under Azeri law, an individual 
who is extorted and then reports the event cannot be held criminally liable for bribery.  
Id. 
 40  FCPA of 1988, supra note 38. For instance, “grease payments” could be made 
for: governmental processing of foreign documents, such as visas; obtaining police 
protection; securing utilities; certain transportation costs; and the delivery of mail. See 
also Rajib Sanyal, Patterns in International Bribery: Violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV., 1, 4 (2012).   
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while preserving its principles as a model for other countries. 
In the 1990s, President Clinton urged the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) to adopt the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in 
International Business Transactions (“the Convention”).41  The U.S. 
government used diplomatic pressure, empirical evidence on the 
negative costs of bribery, and public sentiment against corruption 
to make its case.42  The United States and eighteen member 
countries ratified the Convention, pledging to pass legislation in 
their home countries to prohibit bribery of foreign officials.43  The 
OECD greatly enlarged the jurisdiction of bribery investigations, 
using even broader language than the amendment changes to the 
FCPA that would soon be adopted in 1998.44  The Convention 
called for the jurisdictional provision to be “interpreted broadly 
[enough] so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act 
is not required.”45  The FCPA, as amended, unquestionably followed 
this mandate.46  Following ratification by the United States and 
other member states, the OECD Convention went into effect on 
February 15, 1999.47 
In October 1998, Congress consequently amended the FCPA to 
conform to the international standards set by the OECD 
 
 41  See generally OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) 
[hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
 42  See id. at 1.  The Convention entered into force February 15, 1999 upon the 
ratification of eighteen countries.  By the end of 2001, the OECD Convention was in 
force for all thirty OECD member countries except Ireland, plus five non-member 
countries-Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia.  Lisa M. Landmeier et al., 
Anti-Corruption International Legal Developments, 36 INT’L LAW. 589, 591 (2002). 
 43  By 2001, the OECD Convention was implemented by all 30 OECD member 
countries (except for Ireland), plus five non-member countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia.  Landmeier, supra note 42, at 591.  
 44  See OECD Convention, supra note 41, at 1.  The Convention chose to define a 
“foreign official” more broadly than the FCPA, as not only “any person holding a 
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country,” but also as officials or 
agents of “a public international organization.”  However, the OECD Convention was 
not self-executing nor did it include a model law against corruption.  See Padideh Ala’i, 
The Legacy of Geographic Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current 
Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 877, 924 (2000) (The OECD 
“provides only rough guidelines for its implementing legislation. . . . In view of the 
functional equivalency approach, there is little the OECD Convention requires 
Member States to do in their implementing legislation other than criminalize bribery 
of foreign public officials”). 
 45  See OECD Convention, supra note 41, at 10. 
 46  Brown, supra note 22, at 285–88.  
 47  Ala’i, supra note 44, at 923.  
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Convention.  The 1998 amendment broadened definitions within 
the FCPA’s first section and expanded its jurisdictional reach 
through the modification of sections 78dd-1–3.  Sections 78dd-1 
and 78dd-2 dealt with issuers and domestic concerns and 
introduced three main changes.  First, these sections expanded the 
definition of “foreign official” to include public international 
organizations (such as the United Nations) and their employees.48  
Second, they broadened the definition of bribery to include illegal 
payments that secure “any improper advantage, not simply to 
obtain or retain business.”49  Third, and most significantly, they 
vastly expanded the FCPA’s jurisdiction.50  The FCPA originally 
defined jurisdiction “by use of the mails or means of interstate 
commerce” and applied only to American citizens and entities.51  
Issuers and domestic concerns, or their respective agents, could now 
be charged with violations of the FCPA “irrespective of whether such 
issuer or such officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder 
makes use of the mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
. . . .”52  The jurisdictional limits imposed by the 1977 FCPA, defined 
by use of mails and interstate commerce, were removed, thus 
criminalizing an entirely new set of acts taken by issuers, domestic 
concerns, or U.S. citizens while abroad. 
Part (a) of section 78dd-3 further augmented the jurisdiction of 
the FCPA beyond the issuers, domestic concerns, and their agents 
who were the focus of the 1977 Act.53  For the first time, it made 
anti-bribery provisions applicable to foreign citizens who could 
now be charged for violations if they made “use of the U.S. mails or 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce“54 or 
committed any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, 
promise, etc., “while in the territory of the United States.” 55  Not 
only did section 78dd-3 now include foreigners in its expanded 
jurisdiction, such foreigners did not have to use the mails or 
interstate commerce to be liable for prosecution.  Sections 78dd-1 
through 78dd-3 thus made the U.S. mails and interstate commerce 
 
 48  The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-366, §4, 112 Stat. 3306 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78dd-3 (2006)) 
[hereinafter “FCPA of 1998”]. 
 49  Id.  
 50  FCPA of 1988, supra note 48, § 78dd-3. 
 51  FCPA of 1977, supra note 17.  
 52  FCPA of 1998, supra note 48, § 78dd-1. 
 53  FCPA of 1998, supra note 48, § 78dd-3. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. 
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only one of several possible avenues for prosecution.  The sum of its 
jurisdictional changes made U.S. issuers, domestic concerns, and 
individuals liable for actions committed abroad, and foreigners 
liable for actions committed in the territory of the United States, 
with use of the mails or interstate commerce, or for “any other act 
in furtherance” of bribery.56 
As it stands today, the FCPA includes the core language of 1977, 
along with additional provisions for a new state of mind 
requirement, affirmative defenses, and grease payments.  It contains 
a broadened definition of “foreign officials,” language adding 
“securing any improper advantage” to the obtaining or retaining 
business clause, and expanded jurisdiction.57  The FCPA’s 
proscriptions apply to three groups: “issuers” (corporations with 
registered securities in the United States) and individuals acting on 
their behalf; “domestic concerns” and individuals acting on their 
behalf;  and any other person (including foreign citizens) who 
corruptly makes use of the U.S. mails and interstate commerce, or 
does any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, etc. on U.S. 
territory.58  The large extraterritorial scope of the Act engendered a 
vigorous academic debate about the considerable expansion of 
jurisdiction and the right of the United States (and the OECD) to 
police the business practices of other countries 
C. Debating the 1998 Amendments and Issues of Jurisdiction 
The crux of the debate concerned the tension between 
prosecutorial interpretation of the FCPA’s breadth and the rights of 
foreign nations to combat bribery using their own domestic 
mechanisms.  Critics maintained that the broad reach of the 1998 
amendments exceeded the FCPA’s original jurisdictional mandate.  
They offered four major critiques of the FCPA’s extraterritorial 
application.  First, some critics claimed that the OECD guidelines 
reflect the policy of only the world’s wealthiest industrialized 
countries.59  Second, some noted that bribery is a culturally specific 
practice, with a less pejorative connotation in parts of the 
developing world.60  Third, some said that enforcement of the FCPA 
 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
 58  FCPA of 1998, supra note 48, at § 78dd-3 (for any person).  
 59  Lestelle, supra note 29, at 536 (“There is a notable characteristic of the states 
party to the OECD Convention: the parties are the primary exporters of global capital. 
. . .Of the thirty-six states that have ratified the OECD Convention, these countries are 
responsible for approximately ninety percent of foreign direct investment.”). 
 60 What might be considered bribery in the United States, for example, may be a 
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by the United States created “institutional displacement,” inhibiting 
the development of local institutions.61  Fourth, critics noted that an 
overly aggressive U.S. policy against bribery might heighten 
diplomatic tensions.62 
Proponents of the FCPA engaged these critiques, arguing that 
the Act did not permit an overly broad extraterritorial application of 
American law.63  They noted that the passage of the FCPA and its 
subsequent amendments was the result of decades of diplomacy 
and initiatives to educate the global community about the 
deleterious effects of bribery.64  After the OECD guidelines came 
into effect in 1999, many nations, including the United Kingdom, 
adopted their own anti-bribery legislation.65  No significant 
diplomatic rifts resulted from American enforcement of the FCPA.66  
Indeed, a new global collaboration to police bribery in international 
business emerged.  Proponents also contended that a clear 
difference between bribery and “gift giving” had always existed.67  
Bribery, unlike gifts, involved large sums, and FCPA prosecutions 
 
commonly accepted and even expected “gift giving” in other countries.  See Steven 
Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
419, 431–32 (1999) (“Within this culturally bound ambiguity, the subtle gradations 
of acceptable business practices with regard to gratuities, favors and gifts are a potential 
mine field for legislators seeking to exert their influence extraterritorially.”).  
 61  Although the U.S. may be more committed to and effective in combating 
corruption than developing countries, the improvement of local institutions is more 
important in the long run than short-term enforcement.  Davis, supra note 13, at 509 
(“As a theoretical matter this concern [‘institutional displacement’] arises even in 
situations in which U.S. institutions are clearly more effective in combating corruption 
than local institutions.  Even then, the net impact of relying on U.S. institutions might 
be negative if their operation tends to inhibit the long-term development of local 
institutions.”). 
 62  Marie Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 583, 584 (2006).  
 63  Philip Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 646 (“This article reviews and rejects the claim that anti-bribery 
laws constitute an intrusion thrust upon other countries.”); Ashe, supra note 31, at 8 
(“Rather than viewing recent expanded and aggressive FCPA enforcement as morally 
imperious, these actions should be seen as working to advance international 
partnership in addressing a complex and entrenched problem.”); Lauren Giudice, 
Note, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. REV. 347, 360 (2011).  
 64  Nichols, supra note 63, at 637–39. 
 65  See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Conflict of Minerals (Jun. 19, 2013) 
available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/conflict-minerals/legally-binding-
process/uk-bribery-act.  
 66  Nichols, supra note 63, at 646 (“In . . . twenty years, not one meaningful 
diplomatic rift can be attributed to enforcement of the Act.”). 
 67  Id. 
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only targeted bribes in excess of tens of thousands of dollars.68  
Finally, if the United States abdicated its role in regulating supply-
side bribery, the problem would only worsen.69 
On balance, there is some common ground among the FCPA’s 
critics and proponents, including the widespread disapproval of 
major governmental corruption.70  Nonetheless, the debate 
underscores serious issues regarding the broad jurisdictional 
language of sections 78dd-1 through 78dd-3.71 
III. FCPA ENFORCEMENT AND THE “CULTURE OF SETTLEMENT” 
The problems stemming from the vague language and broad 
scope of the FCPA are compounded by the willingness of 
corporations to settle their cases without going to trial.  Although 
corporate settlement is quite common in many areas of the law, the 
FCPA is unique in its lack of precedent.  The environment of 
enforcement strongly informs the need for legislative reform of 
FCPA section 78dd-3.  The legal ambiguities associated with the 
prosecution of foreign nationals stem from a corporate “culture of 
settlement” and unchecked prosecutorial discretion over 
jurisdiction.  The expansion of the FCPA’s jurisdictional scope under 
 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  For example, significant governmental corruption—as opposed to gift-giving—
is a universally rejected practice, although cultural interpretations as to what constitutes 
bribery vary from region to region.  See Salbu, supra note 60, at 423–24 (“Although 
some disagree, I concede the contention of FCPA supporters that a generic disdain for 
corruption is a universal value, transcending national borders. . . .  I would . . . suggest 
that while all cultures eschew corruption, culture remains a critical differentiator as 
opinions vary on what conduct falls inside and outside of that label.”).  On the issue 
of diplomatic tensions, there is always the possibility that FCPA enforcement could 
strain foreign relations, although to date, this has not occurred.  This may be partly 
because the FCPA has been in force for nearly 35 years, yet prosecutions have only 
developed a significant presence since 2004.  
 71  Some legal scholars have argued that without significant “buy in” from the 
developing world, effective enforcement is less likely.  One compelling way for the U.S. 
to increase “buy in” is to take a more measured stance on foreign bribery, based on 
“persuasion rather than intrusion.”  Salbu, supra note 60, at 445 (Salbu suggests there 
are “two important benefits to addressing the issue of bribery using persuasive rather 
than intrusive measures.  First, persuading the world’s nations to adopt and vigorously 
implement effective domestic anti-bribery laws avoids legitimate charges of 
ethnocentrism.  Second, persuasion is less likely to create global dissension than 
coercive, extraterritorially applied laws.”).  See also Kevin Davis, Does the Globalization 
of Anti-corruption Law Help Developing Countries? in INTERNATIONAL LAW, ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 283 (Julio Faundez & Celine Tan eds., 2010) (arguing 
that if the United States can help other nations to develop their own anti-bribery laws, 
developing countries would not rely solely on the U.S. and neglect their own 
institutions). 
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the 1998 amendments led to a surge in both corporate and 
individual prosecutions, but rarely have cases gone to trial.72  This 
“culture of settlement” reinforces the role of federal prosecutors as 
the sole interpreters of the FCPA’s statutory language—especially as 
it concerns the jurisdiction of individual defendants.  Prosecutors 
expect that individual defendants will settle, partly because 
defendants cannot look to precedent as a means by which to 
evaluate the risk of a trial.  The statutory modification proposed by 
this Note is a means by which to clarify the liability of foreign 
nationals.  Part II.A explores the major vehicles for corporate 
settlement—pleas, non-prosecution agreements, and deferred 
prosecution agreements.  Part II.B examines notable cases of 
prosecutorial over-reaching on jurisdictional issues.  Part II.C 
surveys the effect of the “culture of settlement” on individual 
prosecutions and re-examines possible outcomes for cases in light 
of the proposed statutory reform. 
A. A Source of the Problem: Corporate Pleas, NPAs, and DPAs 
The expansion of the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach resulted in 
large settlements with multinational corporations.  In 2008, the 
largest fine in the history of the FCPA was leveled against Siemens 
AG Corporation after a joint investigation by American and German 
authorities.73  The DOJ and SEC conducted parallel prosecutions of 
Siemens, charging the company with violations of the FCPA’s 
accounting provisions.74  Siemens and its affiliates pleaded guilty to 
the charges, eventually settling for $800 million.75  Siemens also 
 
 72  Another crucial trend not addressed in this paper concerns the impact of 
accounting legislation, namely the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, on the self-reporting 
of corporate FCPA violations.  A number of settlements have come from companies 
reporting internal violations through voluntary disclosures.  For a general discussion 
on the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley and voluntary disclosures on FCPA enforcement, see 
Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of 
Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 443 (2009) 
(analyzing the role of Sarbanes-Oxley in international bribery enforcement); Robert W. 
Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 157 (2010) (discussing 
the scope of disclosure required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 73  Leslie Wayne, Foreign Companies Most Affected by a U.S. Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/business/global/bribery-settlements-
under-us-law-are-mostly-with-foreign-countries.html?pagewanted=all.  
 74  Id.   
 75  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead 
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (“In connection with the cases brought by 
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settled charges with the Munich Public Prosecutor for €395 
million.76  When all the costs were totaled, Siemens paid 
approximately $1.6 billion to both American and German 
authorities.77 
Why would a company accept a fine of that magnitude without 
going to trial?  The answer lies in the advantages that can be gained 
by corporations if they decide to plead guilty.  First, a fine can be 
considerably greater if a corporation is convicted in a court of law. 
In the Siemens case, the U.S. sentencing guidelines actually 
recommended a significantly higher fine—up to $2.7 billion—than 
the one paid.78  Second, bad press and possible stock devaluation 
can follow a lengthy FCPA proceeding,79 an outcome especially 
devastating for public corporations that are directly responsible to 
their shareholders.80  Legal scholars note that corporations are faced 
with a “Hobson’s Choice“ to either accept the DOJ’s charges or 
confront the negative media that accompanies a bribery trial.81  Even 
though the prosecutor’s legal arguments may be untested, 
corporations have strong incentives to accept a plea deal.82 
As FCPA prosecutions have increased, so have Non-Prosecution 
Agreements (“NPAs”) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
(“DPAs”).83  An NPA is not filed with a court, but is instead privately 
negotiated between the accused company and the DOJ.  Included in 
 
the Department, the SEC and the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office, Siemens AG will 
pay a combined total of more than $1.6 billion in fines, penalties, and disgorgement 
of profits, including $800 million to U.S. authorities, making the combined U.S. 
penalties the largest monetary sanction ever imposed in an FCPA case since the act was 
passed by Congress in 1977.”). 
 76  Id.  
 77  Id. See generally 2008 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN PUBLICATIONS (Jan. 5, 
2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2008YearEndFCPAUpdate 
.aspx. 
 78  Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crim. Div., Prepared 
Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at 4 (Nov. 
17, 2009) available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/111709 
breuerremarks.pdf.  See also Giudice, supra note 63, at 349 (It is important to note that 
the settlement figures could have been significantly larger because the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines recommend a criminal fine between $1.35 and $2.7 billion.). 
 79 Lestelle, supra note 29, at 529. 
 80  Id.  
 81  Justin Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating and 
Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 287 (2007).  
 82  Koehler, supra note 4, at 940.  
 83  David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of 
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, 
and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 471, 508 (2009).  
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the agreement are the company’s acknowledgement of its FCPA 
violations and the compliance measures to be implemented in the 
future. 84  A DPA is also privately negotiated, although it is formally 
filed with a court and resembles a pleading.  The DOJ agrees to defer 
prosecution of the company, usually for a two- to four-year period, 
while the company agrees to implement a series of compliance 
measures.85 
NPAs and DPAs have begun to predominate in many different 
areas of criminal wrongdoing, signaling changing trends in DOJ 
enforcement.86  The DOJ currently wields significant power in 
dictating the terms of these various agreements.  As a result of NPAs 
and DPAs, companies can avoid the harshest consequences of 
prosecution, including debarment and suspension from 
government contracts.87  Public corporations choose agreements 
over trials in the hope of evading public disputes over finances and 
allegations that might damage stock prices and shareholder 
confidence.88 Although the NPAs, DPAs, and compliance 
agreements might “preserve the financial viability of a corporation” 
in the short term, they also increase regulatory uncertainty and the 
costs of doing business abroad in the long term.89 
Since plea agreements and alternative resolution vehicles like 
 
 84  Koehler, supra note 4, at 934 (“These agreements often take the form of letter 
agreements from the DOJ to the entity’s lawyer and generally include a brief—often 
times bare-bones—statement of facts replete with legal conclusions that the entity 
acknowledges responsibility for, as well as a host of compliance undertakings that the 
entity agrees to implement.”). 
 85  Id. (“A DPA, on the other hand, is filed with a court and thus has a ‘look and 
feel’ much like a pleading, although the factual allegations also are often bare-bones 
and replete with legal conclusions . . . . There is very little difference between an NPA 
and a DPA.”). 
 86  Id. (“Across all DOJ investigations—not just those under the FCPA—the number 
of settlements between defendants and the DOJ has grown substantially since 2002.  
From 2002 through 2005 the number of NPAs and DPAs exceeded the total number 
that the DOJ entered into in the ten years previous, and FCPA enforcement has been 
no exception.”). See also Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of 
Authority: The Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1–
3 (2006).  
 87  Giudice, supra note 63, at 360. See also Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate 
Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 278–82 (2008). 
 88  Id. at 157.  
 89  Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred And Non-
Prosecution Agreements Impede The Full Development Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y. 137, 138 (2010) (arguing that “[w]hile these agreements provide 
several short-term benefits, the long-term consequences of these agreements perpetuate 
ambiguities surrounding enforcement of the FCPA. . . . An efficient solution to the 
FCPA’s ambiguity problem would be a legislative fix that clarifies the uncertainties 
surrounding the Act while preserving deferred and non-prosecution agreements.”). 
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NPAs and DPAs have become the dominant means of settling FCPA 
investigations, there is a marked absence of case law in FCPA-related 
litigation.90  The lack of case law and judicial scrutiny of alternative 
methods of resolution has serious consequences for corporations in 
assessing their own potential risk of liability.91  NPAs and DPAs do 
not act as binding legal precedent for a court92 and there is little to 
no judicial scrutiny of these methods of settlement.93  Since an NPA 
is not filed with a court, there is no “independent review” of the 
agreement made between the DOJ and the accused company.  It is 
very difficult to gain insight into past prosecutions because NPAs 
and DPAs are not made public.94  Enforcement agencies issue press 
releases about settlements, but these are often little more than brief 
announcements and do not contain crucial information about the 
negotiations.95  In certain cases, NPAs and DPAs are offered to 
companies even before the prosecution has satisfied any burden of 
proving a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.96  Additionally, no 
court has ever rejected an NPA or DPA, largely because the accused 
enters into the agreement willingly to minimize the risk of further 
legal punishment.97  Case law would also be helpful in establishing 
compliance programs and developing defense strategy at trial, but 
there are no such precedents.98 
 
 90  Koehler, supra note 4, at 999–1000 (“Although FCPA resolution vehicles are not 
legal precedent, and although they do not necessarily represent the triumph of one 
party’s legal position over the other, the unfortunate reality in the FCPA context is that 
they do serve as de facto case law”). 
 91 Id. at 999 (“Against the backdrop of a largely vague and ambiguous statute and 
a dearth of substantive FCPA case law, the gap is filled with the resolution vehicles 
typically used to resolve FCPA enforcement actions.”). 
 92  Brooks, supra note 89, at 159 (“The DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs directly affects 
the development of case law under the FCPA because relevant precedent cannot 
develop from settling disputes outside the courtroom. American law depends, in part, 
on the judicial application of stare decisis.”).  See also Vega, supra note 72, at 443 (“In 
addition, deferred prosecution agreements, nonprosecution agreements, and guilty 
pleas do not create binding precedent like a decision in a court of law.”).  
 93  Koehler, supra note 4, at 935 (“Because an NPA is not filed with a court, there is 
absolutely no judicial scrutiny of these agreements, including the statement of facts 
and legal conclusions that serve as the foundation of the agreement.  In other words, 
there is no independent review of the statement of facts to determine if evidence exists 
to support the essential elements of the crime ‘alleged’ or to determine whether valid 
and legitimate defenses are relevant to the ‘alleged’ conduct.”). 
 94  Id. at 934–35. See also Brooks, supra note 89, at 139.  
 95  See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashely, Federal Organizational 
Prosecution Agreements, U. VA. SCH. L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution 
_agreements/ (last updated Jun. 7, 2011) (listing several examples of various NPAs). 
 96  Id.  
 97  Id. (All NPAs and DPAs “have been approved without judicial modification.”). 
 98  Brooks, supra note 89, at 161. (“DPAs and NPAs subvert this process by 
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B. Unilateral Prosecutorial Interpretation of Jurisdiction 
A number of corporate cases have raised serious questions 
about the “culture of settlement” and prosecutors’ interpretation of 
the FCPA’s jurisdictional scope.  In February 2007, the DOJ 
announced that three U.K.-based subsidiaries of Vetco 
International, an oil and natural gas equipment company, pleaded 
guilty to violating the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA under § 
78dd-3.99  One of the Vetco subsidiaries, headquartered in Houston, 
allegedly coordinated the transfer of $2 million in bribes to a 
Nigerian customs official.  Jurisdiction was premised on the fact that 
the subsidiary’s employees used internet communication based in 
Houston to further the bribery scheme.100  Vetco, like other 
corporations, decided to settle its case.101  Commentators speculated 
that if the case had gone to trial, the prosecutor’s interpretation of 
jurisdiction under the FCPA might have been struck down.102 
In May 2005, the FCPA brought an enforcement action against 
a Chinese subsidiary of the U.S.-based Diagnostic Products 
Corporation (“DPC”).103  The DOJ alleged that DPC had paid 
approximately $1.6 million in bribes to doctors and laboratory 
personnel employed by state-owned hospitals in China.104  In 
exchange for the bribes, which were paid between 1991 and 2002, 
hospital employees agreed to buy products manufactured by 
DPC.105  Specifically, it was alleged that DPC “made cash payments 
to laboratory personnel and physicians employed in certain 
hospitals . . . in exchange for agreements that the hospitals would 
obtain [DPC’s products and services].”106  The plea agreement stated 
that jurisdiction was based on the premise that the Chinese 
 
preventing courts from analyzing legal and factual issues and subsequently publishing 
judgments defining specific points of law related to the FCPA—the very process that is 
the essence of developing precedent.”). 
 99  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Vetco International Ltd. Subsidiaries 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Agree to Pay $26 Million in Criminal Fines (Feb. 
6, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/February/07_crm_075.html 
[hereinafter “Vetco Press Release”]. 
 100  Lestelle, supra note 29, at 537.   
 101  Vetco Press Release, supra note 99.  The plea was filed with the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas. 
 102  Vetco Press Release, supra note 99. 
 103  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) LTD. Charged with Violating 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2005/May/05_crm_282.htm.  
 104  Id.  
 105  Id.  
 106  Id.  
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subsidiary of DPC was acting as an agent of the U.S. parent company 
and was therefore liable under the FCPA as a “domestic concern.” 
107  The prosecutor defined the doctors and hospital employees to be 
“foreign officials,” another assumption that was never challenged in 
court. 
The DPC case is an excellent example of the type of 
prosecutorial discretion that is used to interpret the jurisdictional 
language of the FCPA on a unilateral basis.108  Because DPC chose 
to plead guilty to the charges, rather than take the case to trial, there 
was no judicial scrutiny of whether prosecutors overstepped the 
jurisdictional bounds of the FCPA.109  In fact, one of the few FCPA 
cases with judicial scrutiny suggests that allowing “agent liability” 
for foreign subsidiaries is not in accordance with the legislative 
intent of Congress.110  Unlike the Vetco case, in which the subsidiary 
was headquartered in the United States, the DPC subsidiary was 
located in China where the corrupt activity occurred.  There was no 
participation by the U.S.-based operations of DPC. 
The 1998 amendments state that foreign nationals and 
corporations can be liable under the FCPA as long as activity 
furthering the corrupt payment occurred “while in the territory of 
the United States.”111  Legal scholars interpret the language of the 
FCPA and its legislative history to indicate that the FCPA should be 
limited to acts committed in the United States.112  Yet both Vetco 
and DPC decided to settle, and the prosecutorial scope was never 
subjected to review. 
 
 107  Lestelle, supra note 29, at 537. 
 108  Marceau, supra note 81, at 294 (“The DPC enforcement action is perhaps the 
clearest example of the willingness of federal prosecutors to pursue criminal charges in 
cases where either jurisdiction, or liability, or both, is anything but obvious.  That is to 
say, DPC is indicative of a growing body of enforcement actions featuring federal 
prosecutors willing to expend resources investigating and prosecuting corruption cases 
where the statutory authority for such prosecutions is, at best, strained”). 
 109  Marceau, supra note 81, at 294. 
 110  Marceau, supra note 81, at 295 (“Indeed, courts had concluded that permitting 
foreign subsidiary liability under the provisions of the FCPA allowing for ‘agent’ 
liability contravened the clear legislative history on the question of foreign entity 
liability.  Congress had specifically considered extending liability to foreign entities and 
declined to do so.”). 
 111  FCPA of 1998, supra note 38, § 78dd-2.  
 112  Marceau, supra note 81, at 294–95. (“It is clear from both the plain text of 
amendments, and the legislative history that the exercise of independent jurisdiction 
over a foreign entity was limited to those situations where the foreign entity committed 
an act in furtherance of the bribe while in the United States.”). 
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C. Uneven Outcomes for Prosecutions of Foreign Nationals 
From the court’s perspective, judges also have little precedent 
to use at trial.  One of the most important functions of the 
separation of powers is that judges can signal to legislators when 
legal gaps in statutes exist.113  In United States v. Kozeny, U.S. District 
Judge Shira Scheindlin, who sits in the Southern District of New 
York, became one of the few judges to preside over an FCPA trial.114  
In issuing her opinion, Scheindlin noted that there were 
“surprisingly few decisions throughout the country on the FCPA 
over the course of the last thirty years.”115  Since courts rely on the 
principle of stare decisis to establish the parameters of legal conduct, 
lack of precedent is a serious obstacle to interpretation.  Companies 
often accept the enforcement agencies’ statutory interpretations 
because they are unable to confirm if a court of law would agree.116 
Ambiguities in the language of the FCPA and the dearth of 
precedent have made it difficult for individuals, like corporations, 
to weigh the risks of trial.  Between 2005 and 2011, the DOJ charged 
79 individuals with FCPA offenses, with the majority of charges 
occurring since 2008.117  Both American citizens and foreigners are 
subject to prosecution. Prosecutors have broadly interpreted section 
78dd-3 to pursue foreign actors whose bribery has merely had some 
“effect” on business with the United States. 118  A study found that 
sixty-two percent of DOJ cases charging individual criminal 
defendants with foreign bribery schemes in violation of the FCPA 
were resolved by guilty pleas.119 
The difference in sentencing outcomes in the prosecution of the 
following three individuals—all foreigners—shows the effect of the 
“culture of settlement.”  The cases show that the severity of penalty 
corresponded to a defendant’s willingness to accept the charges of 
the prosecutor. 
 
 113  Brooks, supra note 89, at 160.  
 114  U.S. v. Kozeny, 493 F.Supp. 2d 693, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 115  Id. 
 116  Vega, supra note 72, at 443 (“Early settlement means similarly situated 
individuals and corporate defendants never get the opportunity to see if a court agrees 
with the regulators’ reading of the statute.”).  
 117  Mike Koehler, Individual DOJ Prosecutions by the Numbers, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 
20, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/individual-doj-prosecutions-by-the-
numbers (noting that 1 individual was prosecuted in 2005, 6 individuals in 2006, 8 
individuals in 2007, 12 individuals in 2008, 19 individuals in 2009, and 31 individuals 
in 2010, including 22 in Africa Sting Case).  
 118  Lestelle, supra note 29, at 536. 
 119  2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN PUBLICATIONS (July 7, 2008), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008 Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx. 
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Jeffrey Tesler was a British and Israeli citizen charged with 
facilitating corrupt conduct involving the large-scale, systematic 
bribery of Nigerian officials in exchange for engineering, 
procurement, and construction contracts at Bonny Island.120  Tesler 
was charged under the FCPA on the basis of alleged emails that 
passed through American servers and money transferred through 
American bank accounts.  The briberies lasted over ten years and the 
contracts were valued at more than $6 billion.121  Tesler chose to 
accept a plea and received 21 months in prison and two years 
supervised release.122 
Canadian citizen Ousama Namaan was a former agent for 
global chemical manufacturer Innospec, a lead player in contract 
negotiations with the U.N. Oil for Food Program.123  Between 2004 
and 2008, Naaman was charged with offering more than $6.8 
million in bribes to Iraqi officials, earning himself $2.7 million in 
commission on the contracts.124  The company pleaded guilty to 
wire fraud charges as well as violating the FCPA.125  Naaman also 
pled guilty, and was sentenced to 30 months in prison and ordered 
to pay a $250,000 fine.126  Although Naaman was not a U.S. citizen, 
the DOJ held that Naaman’s actions fell within the scope of sections 
78dd-1 and 78dd-3, since he sent emails concerning bribe payments 
through U.S. servers, and also sent improper payments through U.S. 
 
 120  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two UK Citizens Charged by United States with 
Bribing Nigerian Government Officials to Obtain Lucrative Contract as Part of KBR 
Joint Venture Scheme (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
pr/press_releases/2009/03/03-05-09tesler-charge.pdf; Mike Koehler, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 
405 (2010). 
 121  Wayne, supra note 73. 
 122  Laura Brubaker Calkins, Ex-KBR CEO Stanley Gets 2 1/2 Years in Prison for Foreign 
Bribes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2012-
02-23/ex-kbr-ceo-albert-stanley-gets-30-month-prison-term-in-nigeria-bribe-case 
(Albert “Jack” Stanley, an American citizen and former KBR CEO, was sentenced to 60 
months in prison in addition to forfeiting an illicitly-gained sum of $10.8 million.  
Wojciech Chodan, a former sales officer at KBR’s UK subsidiary, was sentenced to 1 
year of probation and a $20,000 fine.  The cooperation of the three men led to eight 
felony pleas, four Deferred-Prosecution agreements, and a total of $1.7 billion in 
penalties.). 
 123  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Innospec Agent Pleads Guilty to Bribing Iraqi 
Officials and Paying Kickbacks Under the Oil for Food Program (June 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-747.html.  
 124  Id.  
 125  Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Sentences Former Innospec Agent To 30 Months, 
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Dec. 22 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/12/22 
/judge-sentences-former-innospec-agent-to-30-months/.  
 126  Id. 
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bank accounts.127  
Joel Esquenazi was president of Terra Communications, based 
in Miami, Florida. Esquenazi was charged with paying $890,000 in 
bribes to shell companies, which then transferred the money to 
Communications D’Haiti (“Haiti Teleco”).128  In exchange for the 
bribes, Terra Communications received preferred 
telecommunications rates from Haiti Teleco.  Esquenazi refused to 
accept a plea deal and defended his innocence at trial.129 Esquenazi 
was convicted by a jury of FCPA violations130 and was sentenced to 
fifteen years in prison—the longest criminal sentence ever handed 
down in an FCPA case.131 
All three prosecutions reflect the growing willingness of the 
DOJ to prosecute individuals, including non-U.S. nationals, for 
business activity occurring primarily abroad.132  The sentences also 
show a considerable variation in outcome. Jeffrey Tesler and 
Ousamaa Namaan both accepted plea agreements and received 21 
and 30 months in prison, respectively.  Esquenazi, however, made 
the decision to go to trial and received 15 years.  But the Bonny 
Island bribery scheme and the Oil for Food Scandal were much 
larger in scope than the incident concerning Haiti Telecom.  Bonny 
Island involved nearly $6 billion-worth of bribes; Oil for Food 
 
 127  Koehler, supra note 4, at 405.  
 128  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for 
Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 
25, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crm-1407.html.  
 129  Mike Koehler, Testing Innocence, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 27 2012), http:// 
www.fcpaprofessor.com/testing-innocence.  
 130  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 128 (A jury trial was brought before 
Judge Jose Martinez in the Southern District of Florida.  The jury ultimately returned a 
guilty verdict on one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and wire fraud, seven 
counts of FCPA violations, one count of money laundering conspiracy, and twelve 
counts of money laundering). 
 131  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 128 (Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney 
General: “This sentence – the longest sentence ever imposed in an FCPA case – is a stark 
reminder to executives that bribing government officials to secure business advantages 
is a serious crime with serious consequence.”).  Prior to Judge Martinez’s sentence, the 
longest FCPA sentence was handed down to Charles Jumet in 2010. Jumet’s sentence 
was 87 months.  Mike Scarcella, 87-Month Prison Longest Ever in FCPA Prosecution, BLOG 
LEGAL TIMES (Apr. 19, 2010), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/04/87month-
prison-sentence-longest-ever-in-fcpa-prosecution.html.  
 132  Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 759 
(2011) (“The recently unsealed indictment of Ousama Naaman under provides an 
example of the enforcement agencies’ use of the FCPA’s expansive jurisdiction to reach 
non-U.S. nationals acting outside of the United States as agents of a U.S. issuer. 
Importantly, recent FCPA enforcement actions demonstrate the DOJ’s willingness to 
prosecute U.S. companies and executives for business activity occurring entirely abroad 
despite U.S.-based personnel’s lack of knowledge and participation.”). 
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involved $6.8 million; and Haiti Teleco involved only $890,000. 
Tesler and Namaan received much shorter sentences for conduct 
that was more widespread and harmful.133 
These sentences were so wildly divergent because Tesler and 
Namaan were willing to settle with the DOJ, while Esquenazi “tested 
[his] innocence.”134  Cooperating in order to receive a lighter penalty 
is often a wise move, especially for FCPA violations.135  Although 
plea bargaining can result in a lighter penalty than one imposed at 
trial,136 the unique circumstances created by FCPA enforcement 
make pleas the accepted standard in individual prosecutions.  The 
pervasive “culture of settlement” allowed the FCPA’s vague language 
to go unchallenged, a weakness that would prove problematic once 
subject to the rigors of the courtroom and judicial review. 
As it stands, the DOJ can use the ambiguities of the FCPA to 
indict foreigners merely because some act associated with bribery—
whether legal or illegal—”took place in the territory of the United 
States.”137  Tweaking the language of section 78dd-3 could impact 
individual prosecutions by giving foreign defendants clear notice of 
the legality of their acts, whether in the United States or abroad. 
Although this change to statutory language will not resolve all the 
FCPA’s issues of jurisdiction, the lack of judicial review, or the 
“culture of settlement,” it can clarify expectations for foreign 
defendants charged under the FCPA who are willing to take their 
cases to trial.  And as the Africa Sting cases show, sometimes foreign 
defendants are willing to take this risk and force the court to 
confront ambiguity in the statute. 
 
 133  Koehler, supra note 4. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Ellen Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2010) (“Our existing legal system places the risk of going 
to trial, and in some cases even being charged with a crime so high, that innocence and 
guilt no longer become the real considerations . . . [rather,] maneuvering the system to 
receive the least onerous consequences may ensure the best result for the accused party, 
regardless of innocence.”).  
 136  Id.  
 137  Mike Koehler, A Q&A With Homer Moyer, Partner at Miller Chevalier, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (May 24, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/05/q-with-
homer-moyer.html (Moyer argues that narrowing the jurisdiction of the FCPA can be 
considered an important priority: “To be sure, in enforcing the FCPA, the government 
tries to overreach from time to time—exercising anti-bribery jurisdiction over foreign 
subsidiaries and aggressive applications of dd-3 jurisdictional on the grounds that 
some step in the process took place “in the territory of the United States” come to mind 
as occasional examples”). 
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IV. THE AFRICA STING TRIALS AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Past prosecutions of individuals have shown that there are 
strong benefits to accepting a plea agreement—and thus, to 
accepting prosecutorial interpretation of the FCPA.  But what 
happened when the FCPA was exposed to comprehensive judicial 
review in trial?  The Africa Sting Trials have been, to date, one of the 
only examples of a court’s examination of the FCPA’s jurisdictional 
scope, and they exposed ambiguities in the law and its enforcement.  
Section III.A will provide background on the Africa Sting Trials.  
Section III.B examines the first two trials, which offered conclusive 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence and jurisdiction of the 
FCPA.  Section III.C analyzes the first ever ruling on section 78dd-3 
of the FCPA.  Section III.D proposes a modification of statutory 
language of section 78dd-3 that would restrict the jurisdiction of the 
FCPA in light of the Africa Sting decision. 
A. Background of the Africa Sting Trials 
The Africa Sting operations began when FBI agents posing as 
Gabonese government officials allegedly enticed executives in the 
defense contracting industry to participate in a bribery scheme.  
According to the FBI plan, the executives would pay a $1.5 million 
bribe to the Gabonese defense minister in exchange for a $15 
million contract to provide body armor, weapons, and military gear 
to Gabon’s National Guard.138  No officials from Gabon were 
actually involved.139  The primary sting operation was carried out at 
a trade gathering in Las Vegas, where federal agents arrested a total 
of twenty one businesspeople, mostly owners and executives of 
military-equipment companies.140  Approximately 150 FBI agents 
 
 138  Christopher Matthews & Joe Palazzalo, Jury Clears Two Businessmen in ‘Sting’ Case 
on Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052 
970203920204577193322932194432.html.  
 139  Id.  The increasing frequency of FCPA prosecutions involving Africa is 
noteworthy.  In 2008 and 2009, DOJ received nearly $579 million in disgorgement 
penalties and fines for acts of bribery with foreign officials in Africa.  The figures on the 
scope of Africa’s economic loss due to corruption are staggering.  Africa loses an 
estimated $148 billion annually—25% of the continent’s gross domestic product—
through corruption.  Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War 
Against Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697, 728 (2006).  A 
2002 study by the African Union estimated that corruption costs the continent $150 
billion per year.  Reagan Demas, Moment Of Truth: Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Critical Alterations Needed in Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other 
Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 315, 322 (2011).   
 140  Mayer Brown, Legal Update, FCPA Sting Operation: 22 Arrested in US; Search 
Warrants Executed Simultaneously in US and UK (January 21, 2010), http:// 
www.mayerbrown.com/publications/FCPA-Sting-Operation-22-Arrested-in-US-
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compiled evidence, which included more than 5,000 taped phone 
calls, more than 800 hours of video and audio recordings, and 231 
recordings of meetings between undercover agents and the 
defendants.141  The DOJ called the Africa Sting Case “the largest 
single investigation and prosecution against individuals in the 
history of DOJ’s enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.”142  After the defendants were indicted by a grand jury, three 
pleaded guilty; but the remainder refused to plead or settle.  The case 
was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
and the defendants were split into four groups for trial.143 
B. The Africa Sting Trials 
The first trial began in the summer of 2011.  Twelve jurors from 
Washington D.C. were asked to determine the guilt of Pankesh 
Patel, John Benson Wier III, Andrew Bigelow, and Lee Allen 
Tolleson.  These defendants, a diverse group of businesspeople in 
the arms industry, both U.S. citizens and foreigners, were charged 
with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, conspiracy to engage in money 
laundering, and substantive violations of the FCPA.144  From the 
start, there were discouraging signs for the prosecution.  The chief 
witness in the trial was Richard Bistrong, who introduced the FBI 
sting team to a number of the defendants.  Bistrong had serious 
credibility problems because he had pleaded guilty—on unrelated 
charges—to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA in 
September of 2009.  In the hope of receiving a lighter sentence, 
Bistrong helped to orchestrate the sting and implicate the 
defendants in a corrupt weapons deal.145  Explicit text messages 
between Bistrong and FBI handlers surfaced during the trial, 
suggesting that FBI agents had difficulties establishing appropriate 
boundaries with Bistrong.146  The presiding judge, Richard Leon, 
 
Search-Warrants-Executed-Simultaneously-in-US-and-UK-01-21-2010/. 
 141  Richard Cassin, DOJ Ends Africa Sting Prosecution, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 12, 2012, 
1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/21/doj-ends-africa-sting- 
prosecution.html.  
 142  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of Military 
and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 
19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/twenty-two-executives-and-
employees-military-and-law-enforcement-products-companies-charged.  
 143  Dan Margolies & Jeremy Pelofsky, US Judge Doubts Single Conspiracy in Bribery 
Case, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2010/02/17 
/arms-bribery-idUSN1715506120100217?type=marketsNews.  
 144  Dep’t of Justice, supra note 142.  
 145  Cassin, supra note 141.  
 146  Paul Friedman & Demme Doufekias, Most Severe Setback To DOJ Thus Far in 
REDIKER FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  8:40 PM 
2015] THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 79 
believed the conspiratorial link between the defendants was 
tenuous.  At a preliminary hearing, Judge Leon asserted: “I read all 
sixteen indictments, and I didn’t see it. I have zero sense that there 
was an omnibus grand conspiracy.”147 
The prosecution also faced difficulty with its presentation of 
evidence at trial.  The prosecution possessed video and audiotapes 
showing some of the defendants actively bribing actual foreign 
officials.148  The prosecution argued that this evidence should be 
admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to demonstrate the 
defendants’ knowledge and intent.  This evidence would have 
shown that these defendants were “predisposed” to commit the 
crime and were not “manipulated” by the government informant.149  
Judge Leon deemed the evidence detailing “prior bad acts” 
inadmissible, including past schemes to make bribery payments for 
weapon contracts.  Critics claimed that the government exercised 
little restraint in the type and quantity of evidence they sought to 
admit under Rule 404(b).150  Critics also noted that the government 
cast too wide a net, selecting defendants without carefully ensuring 
that they had the requisite “predisposition” to commit the particular 
crime.151 
After excluding crucial evidence from trial, Judge Leon ordered 
what is believed to be the first-ever judicial ruling on the 
jurisdictional scope of § 78dd-3 of the FCPA.152  Prong 3 in § 78dd 
was added to the statute as part of the 1998 amendments.  It applied 
to ‘‘persons other than issuers or domestic concerns’’ and required 
that an individual, “while in the territory” of the United States, make 
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
 
FCPA Prosecutions: Judge Dismisses All Charges in Africa Sting Case, MONDAQ (February 
27, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/166392/White+Collar+Crime+ 
Fraud/Most+Severe+Setback+To+DOJ+Thus+Far+In+FCPA+Prosecutions+Judge+Dis
misses+All+Charges+In+Africa+Sting+Case. 
 147  Margolies & Pelofsky, supra note 143.   
 148  Eric Bruce, Matthew Menchel & David McGill, Inside the Africa Sting Trial: 
Anatomy of a Failed Prosecution, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 23, 2012), http:// 
www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/fcpa-trials.  
 149  Michael Volkov, Lessons Learned from the Africa Sting Case, Corruption Crime 
Compliance, VOLKOV LAW GROUP (Apr. 18, 2012), http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2012/04/ 
lessons-learned-from-the-africa-sting-case/.  
 150  Bruce et al., supra note 148 (“Seeking to admit such a wide range of prior bad 
acts evidence pertaining to deals outside the U.S. was, in our view, a strategic misstep 
by the government.”). 
 151  Bruce et al., supra note 148. 
 152  Mike Koehler, 2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Year in Review: Scrutiny, Reform, 
and Individual Prosecutions are Key Issues, WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT (Jan. 27, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992616.  
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commerce or do any other act in furtherance of a bribery scheme.153  
Defendant Pankesh Patel, a British citizen and executive at a 
weapons marketing firm, filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 acquittal motion 
to strike the FCPA charge premised on his dispatch of a package—
containing the purchase agreement in furtherance of the alleged 
corrupt scheme—from the United Kingdom to the United States.  
The court granted this motion and dismissed the charge, calling the 
DOJ’s jurisdictional support “novel” and lacking in precedent.154  
The prosecution also faced difficulties relating to its selection of 
court.155  Commentators have suggested that it might have been 
more advantageous to the prosecution to bring the case to trial in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, whose 
juries have a more conservative reputation.156  The first trial ended 
when the jury deadlocked, and Judge Leon declared a mistrial as to 
all remaining counts against Patel, Bigelow, Wier, and Tolleson.157 
The second trial began several months later in September of 
2011.  The second group of defendants was R. Patrick Caldwell, 
John Mushriqui, Jeana Mushriqui, John Godsey, and Marc 
Morales.158  The DOJ was determined to proceed with the case, but 
once again, had difficulty proving the elements of conspiracy. Judge 
Leon dismissed the conspiracy counts, noting that most of the 
evidence indicated that the defendants had not met or spoken with 
each other.159  The jury was again skeptical about the credibility of 
Richard Bistrong.160  This skepticism led the jury to acquit two 
defendants and deadlock on charges against the remaining three. 
Judge Leon declared a mistrial for the second time.  In dismissing 
the indictments, he specifically referenced the “government’s very, 
very aggressive conspiracy theory,” which, “in the second trial . . . 
snapped in the absence of the necessary evidence to sustain it.”161  
 
 153  FCPA of 1998, supra note 38, at § 78dd-3(a). 
 154  Koehler, supra note 152, at 6.   
 155  Volkov, supra note 149 (“Any federal prosecutor who worked in the District of 
Columbia knows one thing – undercover “stings” are extremely difficult and 
unpopular in front of DC juries. . .”). 
 156  Volkov, supra note 149.  
 157  Bruce et al., supra note 148. 
 158  Richard Cassin, Africa String Trial: After Partial Verdict, Judge Sends Jury Back, 
FCPA BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012, 2:30PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/1/24/ 
africa-sting-trial-after-partial-verdict-judge-sends-jury-ba.html#.   
 159  Id.   
 160  Friedman & Doufekias, supra note 146 (The explicit text messages sent between 
Bistrong and the FBI prompted the foreman of the jury to comment publicly that the 
jury found the government’s witnesses to have little credibility.). 
 161  Friedman & Doufekias, supra note 146.  
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In short, the state failed to prove conspiracy, relied on an 
untrustworthy witness, and presented the FBI agents in a poor 
light.162 
C. Lessons Learned About Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Jurisdiction 
The third trial was slated to begin in March 2012, but, in 
February, the DOJ dropped the FCPA charges against the remaining 
defendants, and even dismissed the counts against the three 
individuals who had pleaded guilty.163  The DOJ explained that, 
given the outcomes of the first two trials, the inadmissibility of 
evidence under Rule 404(b), and the large expenditure of public 
resources, it was not in the interest of the U.S. government to 
continue the trial.164  Judge Leon offered perhaps the best summary 
of the Africa Sting Trials: “This appears to be the end of a long and 
sad chapter of white-collar criminal enforcement.”165 
The Africa Sting Trials are excellent examples of prosecutors’ 
overconfidence regarding the outcomes of investigations before 
they happen.  Eric Dubelier, a partner at Reed Smith and counsel to 
R. Patrick Caldwell in the second Africa Sting Trial, made two 
significant observations about the trial.166  First, he noted that many 
of the problems were based in the sting operation itself, since the 
jury never heard the defendants formally agree to be involved in a 
 
 162  Mike Koehler, Africa Sting – A “Long and Sad Chapter in the Annals of White Collar 
Criminal Enforcement, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Feb. 23, 2012), http:// 
www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/africa-sting-a-long-and-sad-chapter-in-the-
annals-of-white-collar-criminal-enforcement/. (Michael Madigan, defense counsel in 
the second Africa sting trial, pithily summarized the weaknesses of the prosecution, 
noting that the DOJ was hamstrung by its “choice of a snitch (a despicable, dishonest 
30-year cocaine addict and admitted thief of millions of dollars hidden in Swiss bank 
accounts from his prior employer), the ‘it’s all just a game’ commentary from the agents 
who disrespected the rule of law, and the structuring of the ‘sting’ in its documents and 
taped conversations to make the Defendants think it was a legal transaction they were 
being asked to participate in. . . .”). 
 163  CM Matthews, Justice Dept. Drops FCPA Sting Case, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 21, 
2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/21/justice-dept-drops-fcpa-sting-case/.  
      164  Pl’s. Mot. to Dismiss, at 3, U.S. v. Goncalves, (2008) (Criminal No. 09-335). Mot. 
to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), U.S. v. Goncalves, (2012) Criminal No. 
09-335). See also Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics are Doubted, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/ fbi-bribery-
case-falls-apart-and-raises-questions.html?_r=0 (The DOJ also pointed to the fact that 
its key informant, Richard Bistrong, admitted to using cocaine and hiring prostitutes.). 
 165  Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics are Doubted, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/fbi-bribery-case-falls-apart-
and-raises-questions.html?_r=0. 
 166  Telephone Interview with Eric Dubelier, Partner, Reed Smith (Oct. 19, 2012).  
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crime.167  According to Dubelier, the failure of the Africa Sting Trials 
should motivate the government to change its tactics for future 
stings by being more careful and explicit when collecting evidence 
for trial.168  Second, Dubelier stated that the prevailing practice of 
corporate settlement and voluntary disclosures affected the attitude 
of federal prosecutors.169  In the Africa Sting Trials, the government 
was quite inflexible in terms of what it offered the defendants.  
Dubelier noted that “[t]he only deal they were offering was jail.  
There was no downside to trying the case.”170  Individuals charged 
under the FCPA may find the prospect of trial more appealing now, 
especially when conspiracy cannot be proven and the jurisdictional 
link is tenuous.171  Dubelier explained, “[t]he major problem in the 
Africa Sting Trials was that the government thought that everyone 
was going to plead guilty. . . .  There has been a mindset in the [DOJ] 
Fraud Section that these individual prosecutions will all settle.”172  
When defendants decided to contest the charges in court, the 
government was not adequately prepared to try the case. 
Most importantly, Judge Leon refused to accept the DOJ’s 
claims for jurisdiction and provided the first ruling to ever interpret 
section 78dd-3.  Judge Leon ruled that the purchase agreement, sent 
by Pankesh Patel through the mail, did not qualify as a jurisdictional 
hook under section 78dd-3 of the FCPA.173  Patel was a citizen of 
the United Kingdom and director of a British company that acted as 
a sales agent for companies in the military products industry.174  
Patel had flown from the United Kingdom to the United States, 
where he met with a fictitious official and received a purchase 
agreement.  He then returned to the United Kingdom and sent a 
package, which contained the purchase agreement, via DHL back to 
the United States.  The DOJ charged Patel under section 78dd-3 as 
“a ‘person’ other than an issuer or a domestic concern” who had, 
while in the territory of the United States, corruptly made use of the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to 
 
 167  Id.  
 168  Id.  
 169  Id. (“The government has been riding a wave of voluntary disclosures and 
corporate settlements.”). 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Telephone Interview with Eric Dubelier, Partner, Reed Smith (Oct. 19, 2012). 
 173  Mike Koehler, Significant dd-3 Development in Africa Sting Case, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(June 9, 2011, 12:08 EST), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/06/ significant-dd-
3-development-in-africa.html. 
 174  Id.  
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do any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, etc.175 
One question before the Court was whether Patel had 
committed an illegal act by mailing the package from the United 
Kingdom.  Patel’s attorney, Eric Bruce, argued that, according to the 
provisions of section 78dd-3, Patel could only be charged for illegal 
activity that he committed in the United States.  Bruce stated, “[h]e’s 
a U.K. citizen, operating a U.K. company, he’s not a domestic 
concern under the statute, he can only be liable under the FCPA 
statute for conduct ‘while in the territory of the United States.’  And 
that’s required by statute.  That’s their sort of jurisdictional hook on 
him.”176  Bruce maintained that Patel had done nothing illegal in 
the United States.  He had completed the corrupt deal only from the 
United Kingdom.  Bruce explained, “[s]o literally they’ve charged 
him with being in London and dropping a DHL package in the mail 
as a substantive FCPA violation, while the statute very clearly 
requires that he can only be liable for something while in the 
territory of the United States.”177  According to Bruce’s interpretation 
of section 78dd-3, an illegal act had to be taken while a foreigner 
was in the United States in order for such person to be charged with 
an FCPA violation. 
Joseph Lipton (“Lipton”), the DOJ attorney, offered a very 
different interpretation.  He argued that Patel did not need to 
commit an illegal act while in the territory of the United States; he 
just needed to commit any act.  Lipton explained that Patel, as a U.K. 
citizen, “actually has to do less than a U.S. citizen really, because a 
U.S. citizen has to make use of the mails or interstate commerce.  
And Mr. Patel just has to take an act, any act, while he’s in the United 
States.  Doesn’t have to be an illegal act, doesn’t have to be anything 
related to the deal going forward.”178  Lipton then went on to argue 
that although Patel had not done anything illegal in the United 
States, his act was part of the bribery scheme.  Lipton noted: 
He has to take any act in the United States, which he clearly does.  First 
of all, he flies over from the U.K. to the United States, which we 
established through his travel records.  And then he meets with the 
fictitious official and receives a purchase agreement.  He then later takes 
that purchase agreement and sends it back.179 
 
 175  Indictment at ¶¶ 2, 7, United States v. Patel (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2009) (No. 1:09-
cr-00338-RJL).  
 176  Transcript of Record at 7, United States v. Patel (D.D.C., June 6, 2011) (No. 09-
0335).  
 177  Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added).  
 178  Id. at 8.  
 179  Id. at 8–9. 
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Lipton claimed, “you don’t have to prove all of the elements of 
the offense while he’s in the United States . . . .  He just has to take 
an act while he’s in the United States.  He did take an act.”180 
Judge Leon, however, was not comfortable with Lipton’s 
reasoning and asked him to clarify the DOJ’s position.  Judge Leon 
urged: 
Help me understand why it doesn’t have to be an act while in the territory 
of the United States for Count 3, whereas Count 2 [a substantive FCPA 
offense against Patel based on his attendance at a Washington D.C. 
meeting to discuss the allegedly corrupt deal], sounds like you admit that 
that’s the case in Count 2.  In Count 3, I think your rationale is since he’s 
already taken one act within the United States, the subsequent act of 
mailing doesn’t have to be within the United States, right?181 
Lipton replied, “Correct, Judge.”182  Judge Leon, however, did 
not accept Lipton’s argument and sought authority for Lipton’s 
claim that any act taken within the United States was sufficient to 
prove bribery committed outside the United States.  The following 
exchange ensued: 
Judge Leon: Has the Supreme Court said that? 
Lipton: Judge, no. 
Judge Leon: Has the D.C. Circuit said that? 
Lipton: No. 
Judge Leon: How about the Second Circuit, where you used to 
prosecute? 
Lipton: Judge, there’s not a lot of case law on the FCPA, as 
Your Honor I think is well aware. 
Judge Leon: So is this a novel interpretation you want me to 
take?183 
The exchange underscored the lack of case law pertaining to the 
FCPA.  Judge Leon, unwilling to accept Lipton’s broad 
interpretation, noted, “I would think the more cautious, 
conservative interpretation would be that each act has to be while 
in the territory of the United States, wouldn’t it?”184  Bruce, Patel’s 
attorney, then responded to Lipton’s claim as follows: 
The statute plainly requires, Your Honor, that while in the territory of the 
United States he has to corruptly make use of the mails or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or do any act in furtherance of an 
offer, payment, promise to pay or authorization.  It’s clear as day.185 
Judge Leon, in the first judicial ruling on section 78dd-3, 
 
 180  Id. at 9.  
 181  Id. 
 182  Transcript of Record at 10, United States v. Patel (D.D.C., June 6, 2011) (No. 
09-0335).  
 183  Id.  
 184  Id. at 11.  
 185  Id.  
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granted Patel’s motion for acquittal.186 
D. Reforming the Language of FCPA Section 78dd-3 
In his decision to acquit Patel, Judge Leon substantially 
narrowed the jurisdictional hook of section 78dd-3.  Judge Leon’s 
ruling implied that a defendant charged under this statute must 
commit, while in the United States, an illegal act of bribery, not 
simply “any act.”  Yet Judge Leon only issued an oral decision from 
the bench; he did not offer a written interpretation of section 78dd-
3.  The fact that Bruce and Lipton could propose such widely 
divergent interpretations of section 78dd-3 suggests that the 
language of the statute is still in need of clarification.  A slight 
modification of the language of section 78dd-3 is needed to 
reconcile these varying interpretations.  Such a change would be a 
small step toward addressing larger problems involving the lack of 
judicial review, vague statutory language, and the “culture of 
settlement” that results. 
In order to be charged under the FCPA, a foreign citizen must 
satisfy two conditions: first, he must commit an act while in the 
territory of the United States and second, he must “corruptly” make 
use of either the U.S. mails or interstate commerce or do any other 
act in furtherance of an offer, etc.187  Lipton made a critical mistake 
in failing to argue that Patel’s act in the United States, while not 
illegal on its own, was in furtherance of the bribery scheme.  A 
reasonable case could have been made that most bribery schemes 
unfold in stages, and that, although Patel’s act in the United States 
was not itself illegal, it was “in furtherance” of an illegal scheme.  
However, Lipton chose to make a more sweeping argument. Judge 
Leon’s exchange with Lipton and his subsequent decision to acquit 
Patel suggest that he interpreted the language of section 78dd-3 to 
mean that foreigners must commit an illegal act in the U.S in order 
to be held in violation of the FCPA. 
Yet Judge Leon’s decision does not completely dispel the 
reigning confusion.  The language “any other act in furtherance of 
an offer” still retains unduly wide latitude for interpretation.  “In 
furtherance” continues to make section 78dd-3 open to future 
readings that the act taken does not need to be illegal, but only 
needs to further an illegal scheme.  This Article suggests that the 
language of section 78dd-3 could be clarified to read: 
It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer or domestic 
 
 186  Koehler, supra note 173. 
 187  FCPA of 1998, supra note 48. 
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concern, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use 
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or 
to do any other corrupt act relating to an offer, payment, promise to pay, 
etc. 
By removing “in furtherance” and clarifying that “any other act” 
must also be corrupt, the statute would make clear that any act in 
furtherance of bribery on U.S. soil does not necessarily constitute a 
violation of the FCPA.  This change would make it possible to 
delineate the illegal elements of a bribery scheme that might unfold 
in stages, involving both illegal and legal acts.  It would provide the 
DOJ with a clearer mandate for prosecution and create greater 
transparency in the law.  Most importantly, it would clarify 
jurisdiction and limit the ability of the DOJ to conduct overly broad 
prosecutions of foreigners who have committed no illegal acts on 
U.S. soil. 
Although a small change to statutory language cannot solve the 
entire problem involving the FCPA’s vague language on jurisdiction, 
the lack of judicial review, and the “culture of settlement,” it can 
clarify expectations for foreign defendants charged under the FCPA 
who are willing to take their cases to trial.  This subtle modification 
of the statutory language could impact individual prosecutions—
like those associated with Bonny Island, Oil for Food, and Haiti 
Telecom—by giving foreign defendants clear notice regarding the 
legality of their acts, whether in the United States or abroad.  The 
outcomes of the three individual prosecutions discussed above may 
not have come out differently as a result of this statutory 
modification, but the defendants would undoubtedly have had a 
clearer picture of their odds at trial.  As it stands, the DOJ can use 
the ambiguities of the FCPA to indict foreigners merely because 
some act associated with bribery—whether legal or illegal—“took 
place in the territory of the United States.”188  This suggested 
modification to statutory language would help to clarify jurisdiction 
and address problems created by the FCPA’s “culture of settlement.” 
 
 
 188  A Q&A with Homer Moyer, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 24, 2011), http:// 
www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-qa-with-homer-moyer. (Moyer argues that narrowing the 
jurisdiction of the FCPA can be considered an important priority: “To be sure, in 
enforcing the FCPA, the government tries to overreach from time to time—exercising 
anti-bribery jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries and aggressive applications of dd-3 
jurisdictional on the grounds that some step in the process took place ‘in the territory 
of the United States’ come to mind as occasional examples.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Between 1977, when the FCPA was enacted, and 2003, when 
the DOJ began to increase prosecutions, almost no cases went to 
trial.  The FCPA was largely unenforced.  After 2003, the DOJ began 
to prosecute more vigorously, but almost all cases were resolved 
through settlement routes: DPAs, NPAs, and plea agreements. If the 
FCPA is to remain a strong tool in combatting bribery, it must be 
subject to judicial review.  A body of precedent must be established 
that both defense and prosecution attorneys can reference.  The 
language of the act should be clarified.  Phrases such as “foreign 
official,” “obtaining and retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to any person,” and “any other act in furtherance of an 
offer” will need further definition through the courts.  This Article 
suggests one change in language that can serve to make the law 
clearer. 
The FCPA has successfully spread awareness that corruption is 
an unacceptable way of doing business, but it has also overreached 
by limiting the right of other countries to regulate their own citizens’ 
business conduct.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Microsoft 
Corp v. AT&T Corp.: ‘‘United States law governs domestically but 
does not rule the world.’’189  Extraterritorial FCPA enforcement 
against foreign companies or individuals for actions taken outside 
the United States neglects the Supreme Court’s admonitions and 
may also prove short sighted in achieving the ultimate goal of 
eliminating corruption and bribery in an increasingly global, 
integrated world economy.  The state’s loss in the African Sting Trials 
may in fact prove to be the law’s gain, encouraging corporations, 
individuals, judges, and the DOJ to begin the long overdue process 
of judicial review of the FCPA. 
 
 
 189  United States v. Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007). The court refused to 
apply U.S. patent law to an infringement based claim based on software code created 
in the U.S. but installed by a foreign manufacturer in a computer made overseas.  The 
court noted the distinction in enforcing U.S. law at home and abroad “applies with 
particular force in patent law.” Id. at 455. 
